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In On the Plurality of Worlds, David Lewis discusses the principle of 
recombination. It is a principle conceptualised to give us a precise sense what it 
means for there to be a plenitude of worlds in modal realism, and to explain why a 
plenitude of worlds is the case. Lewis notes a distinction needs to be made 
between the qualified and unqualified principles of recombination, and he argues 
only the qualified principle may get the above work done. On the contrary, Daniel 
Nolan argues the unqualified principle of recombination does not have the 
problems Lewis thinks it has, and it may and should serve as the principle that can 
explain the above. In addition, Nolan thinks other theories of modality may help 
themselves to the unqualified formulation of the principle of recombination. In 
this thesis, I argue the principle of recombination in both its qualified and 
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 We use modal notions in our everyday lives. We talk about possibilities 
and necessities. We ponder the possibility of getting a particular dream job. We 
think that mathematical truths are necessary in some sense. There are other kinds 
of everyday concepts that may turn out to be modal concepts- the concepts of 
dispositions, properties, or counterfactuals are examples. So an analysis of 
modality would be useful in clarifying such notions. Analysing modality in terms 
of the ontological import of modal talk is a concern of modal metaphysics. There 
is the question of what makes it the case that “necessarily P” or “possibly P” 
(where P is some sentence).  
 The motivation for engaging in a discussion of the ontological import of 
modal talk is threefold. First, it gives us an analysis of modal claims- or failing 
that, at least an explanation of why they are primitive and cannot be fruitfully 
explained. Second, giving an account of the ontological import of modal talk is 
the first step in providing an account of how we come to know it- we cannot know 
how we know something if we do not know what that something is in the first 
place. So the account would shed light on modal epistemology. Third, the 
ontology might be fruitful in explaining other interrelated phenomena such as 
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counterfactuals, properties, or the status of the relation between a prioricity and 
necessity- it might be theoretically fruitful1. 
 The ontological import of modal talk can be explained reductively or non-
reductively. A reductive account of modality gives an account of modality in 
terms of non-modal notions, a non-reductive account does not. An example of a 
non-reductive account of modality is one that seeks to explain modal claims in 
terms of other modal claims like this: Where P and Q are sentences, necessarily P 
if and only if not possibly not-P, while possibly Q if and only if not necessarily 
not-Q2. This is obviously not reductive as notions of possibility and necessity are 
explained in terms of each other, shedding no light on their ontological import. 
An example of a reductive account of modality is one that explains possibility and 
necessity in terms of worlds. Under this analysis, necessarily P if and only if P is 
true in all accessible worlds, while possibly Q if and only if Q is true in some 
accessible world. The challenge for this particular strategy is to explain the nature 
of worlds. If we want to elucidate the ontology the underpins modality, we need 
to elucidate the notion of worlds that is used to cash them out. 
 This thesis will examine a particular feature of David Lewis’s reductive 
account of modality that uses the strategy of analysing modality in terms of 
worlds- the principle of recombination. Lewis devised the principle of 
                                                          
1 Theodore Sider, “Reductive Theories of Modality,” in The Oxford Handbook of 
Metaphysics, edited by Michael J. Loux and Dean W. Zimmerman (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2003), 4. 
2 Ibid., 5. 
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recombination as a way to explain what it means to have a plenitude of worlds. 
One corollary is that the principle may double as an account of the range of 
worlds there are- this is the aspect of the principle which philosophers like David 
Efird and Tom Stoneham find attractive.  
 Lewis thinks a qualified form of the principle is required to cash out 
plenitude, while Nolan and the rest above who hinge on his insight think the 
unqualified principle of recombination is sufficient to cash out plenitude and play 
the role of an account of the range of worlds there are. I will argue that contrary to 
the philosophers above, the principle of recombination- in both its qualified and 
unqualified forms- is not a feasible explanation of what it means to have a 
plenitude of worlds, and it cannot serve as an account of the range of worlds there 
are 
 The first chapter of the thesis will provide an analysis of the principle of 
recombination. I will provide a quick overview of modal realism and the reasons 
that motivate it, and discuss the role the principle of recombination plays in it. 
Then, I provide a precise conception of the principle of recombination and the 
notions that are involved in conceptualising it. The second chapter argues for the 
unfeasibility of the unqualified principle of recombination contrary to what 
philosophers like Nolan think. The third chapter argues for the unfeasibility of the 
qualified principle of recombination that Lewis prefers. The conclusion we shall 
reach is largely negative: we will find the principle of recombination wanting, 
unable to do any of the theoretical work philosophers think it might be able to do. 
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We shall uncover theoretical faults that will render it an inadequate way to make 
expressions of the plenitude of worlds make sense, and it will not be able to serve 




Chapter 1: The Principles of Recombination 
 
1.0.0 Issues in Modal Metaphysics 
 
In this chapter, we set the groundwork for further discussion in the later 
chapters. Before we can say anything about why the principle of recombination is 
unfeasible, we need to have a clear conception of what exactly it is, and why it is 
philosophically interesting. To that end, this chapter will be devoted to discussing 
the philosophical import of the principle of recombination as part of modal 
realism, and give a precise formulation of what the principle is. The chapter will 
first give an overview of modal realism and the philosophical motivation for it, 
followed by a discussion of the philosophical motivation for the principle of 
recombination. Then it will offer a formulation of the principle, and provide a 
disambiguation of the terms used to define it. 
 
1.1.0 Lewis’s Modal Realism 
 
Modal realism is a metaphysical thesis that holds there are countless other 
worlds that are spatiotemporally isolated from each other. 
Lewis posits the existence of such worlds because they have great 
explanatory power. It is motivated on the grounds of its uses in explaining 
phenomena, and its indispensability for a reductive analysis of modality3. Objects 
                                                          
3 David Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), 3. 
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in other worlds may be used to underpin the semantics of our linguistic claims, or 
a theory of properties. Lewis argues that modal realism ends up being the best 
explanation among the theories he discusses- linguistic, pictorial, and magical 
ersatzism. It is reductive and has the greatest explanatory power, at great but 
tolerable ontological cost.  
 Despite having such alleged theoretical benefits, modal realism is counter-
intuitive. According to the modal realist, worlds will end up containing concrete 
objects - objects like our bodies or animals. We might question why we should 
say worlds are worlds just like ours, rather than saying they are something 
abstract- something that is non-spatiotemporal, like numbers. Intuitively, worlds 
are abstract while the actual world is concrete.  Lewis has a response against this 
more intuitive way of cashing out what worlds are. He anticipated people might 
make a distinction between concrete and abstract and distinguish actual and 
possible worlds using the two notions respectively4.  
Lewis argues that there is no good way of drawing the distinction between 
the concrete and the abstract5. First, it is not a clear distinction. If the distinction 
between the concrete and the abstract is unclear, then it is not a good way of 
drawing the distinction between actual and possible worlds. So we cannot help 
ourselves to the intuition that the actual world is concrete while possible ones are 
abstract because of the lack of clarity with regard to the concepts used in cashing 
                                                          
4 Ibid., 81. 
5 David Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds, 82. 
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out the intuition.  Second, none of the ways of drawing the distinction between the 
abstract and concrete imply that actual worlds are concrete while possible ones 
are abstract; so having the distinction clearly elucidated is not a reason to think 
modal realism is not true. 
Lewis considers four possible ways to distinguish between the concrete 
and the abstract, and argues that it is not clear which way is the right one, but that 
in any case none of them deliver the conclusion that the actual is concrete while 
the merely possible is abstract. 
First, the way of example draws the distinction between the concrete and 
the abstract via intuitive examples. It gives paradigmatic examples of what are 
concrete, like donkeys, and gives examples of what are abstract, like numbers. 
These paradigmatic examples are meant to guide us in determining whether other 
objects are concrete or abstract. However, this unprincipled way of determining 
what is abstract or concrete becomes less reliable when we are asked to determine 
the ontological status of less intuitive objects like worlds. Our intuitions may go 
either way depending on our inclinations and theoretical prejudices. According to 
this way of drawing the distinction, there is nothing to stop anyone from saying 
all worlds are concrete or otherwise, because competing intuitions do not generate 
a clear answer. So this is not a good way to get the intuitive distinction we want. 
Second, the way of conflation draws the distinction between the concrete 
and the abstract as a distinction between individuals and sets, or between 
particulars and universals, or between particular individuals and everything else. 
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Lewis notes these ways of drawing the distinction do not give us a principle that 
tells us whether worlds are concrete or abstract. There is nothing to stop him from 
saying worlds are concrete on these accounts; worlds may just be made up of 
individuals as Lewis’s modal metaphysics noted, and are thus concrete. They are 
not abstract sets. 
Third, the way of negation draws the distinction between the concrete and 
the abstract by explaining abstract entities in terms of what they are not6. 
According to this way of drawing the distinction, abstract entities have no 
spatiotemporal location, and they do not come into causal relations. Lewis notes 
that this way of drawing the distinction is incompatible with how the way of 
conflation draws the distinction. According to the way of conflation, abstract 
entities are sets, and sets of spatiotemporal locations do seem to have a location 
insofar as they are where their members are. So according to the way of negation, 
sets will turn out to be abstract, but not all sets turn out to be abstract according to 
the way of conflation. We have no way of deciding which way is the correct way 
to draw the distinction between the concrete and abstract, and so no reason to 
think that either of these can be a guide to the status of the possible. 
Fourth, the way of abstraction draws the distinction between the concrete 
and the abstract by defining abstract entities as abstractions from concrete entities; 
that abstract entities are concrete entities with their specificity subtracted7. Other 
                                                          
6 Ibid., 83. 
7 Ibid., 83. 
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than being unclear- we have no clear idea what it means for a concrete entity to 
have its specificity subtracted- the way of abstraction runs into the problem of 
coming into conflict with other ways of drawing the distinction too. It conflicts 
with the way of negation. For example, the way of negation claims abstract 
entities have no spatiotemporal location, but according to the way of abstraction, 
sets of spatiotemporal locations are still located even after having their specificity 
removed. It may run into conflict with the ways of example and conflation too, 
insofar as it gives a positive conception of what abstract entities are that may or 
may not accord with what is determined by the ways of example and conflation.  
Once again, this way of drawing the distinction is problematic insofar as it 
does not seem to agree with the other ways, and we have no way of adjudicating 
which is the correct way of drawing the distinction such that we have a plausible 
conception of what counts as concrete and abstract. Also, one upshot is that the 
above four ways of conceptualising the distinction do not force him to conceive of 
worlds as something abstract and not concrete- so none of the ways of drawing 
the distinctions are uncongenial to modal realism. That is because according to 
the four ways of drawing the distinction between the concrete and the abstract, 
none imply that worlds per se are abstract or concrete. 
The explanatory power of modal realism, and the alleged failure of various 
forms of ersatzism led Lewis to the ontological profligacy of modal realism. So, 
according to Lewis, the best- and hence at the very least reasonable to think true- 
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explanation for modality is that worlds are just like this world in the sense they 
are filled with the kinds of objects found in this world. 
 
1.1.1 Motivating the Principle of Recombination: Difficulties in Expressing 
the Fact of Plenitude 
 
It is within such a theory of modality that the principle of recombination is 
situated. The principle of recombination is meant to substantiate modal realism’s 
claims that state there are a plenitude of worlds. This section will provide the 
motivation for positing the principle of recombination. It will explain why the 
principle of recombination turns out to be the principle that best substantiates 
claims about the fact of plenitude, and why other ways do not work out. 
At the beginning of On the Plurality of Worlds, Lewis notes there are 
“countless other worlds” like ours8. For Lewis, the existence of an uncountable 
infinitude of worlds will work as part of the best explanation for phenomena 
ranging from properties to semantics. 
 The reason for positing a countless infinitude of worlds is simple and 
intuitive. Let us say that in this actual world, the distance between a particular 
point on my cup of coffee and a particular point on my laptop is five centimeters. 
It is intuitively the case that it is possible the distance between those two 
particular regions is four point ninety-nine centimeters, and any real number 
                                                          
8 Ibid., 2. 
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below or above that. Insofar as the cardinality of the real numbers used to 
measure the distance between the particular regions is uncountable, this example 
alone already generates an uncountable infinitude of possibilities where each real 
number expresses the distance between the two particular regions. That is why 
there is an uncountable infinitude of worlds. That is to say, for every way a world 
can be, there is a world where that way the world can be is the case. 
 But Lewis notes that the expression of the fact of plenitude as “for every 
maximally specific way a world can be, there is a world where that way a world 
can be is the case” is insufficient9. Because according to modal realism, every 
way a world can be is just a world, and this renders the above statement of the 
correspondence between every maximally specific way a world can be to a world 
a tautological one. It is just saying that every world corresponds to a world. It can 
be the case that every way a world can be is finite in number, and this would be 
consistent with the statement above. So the above is not an expression of the fact 
of plenitude. We need a better way to express that fact. 
 One might contend that we may render the above expression non-
tautological by distinguishing between every way worlds can be and worlds 
themselves. Then the statement of the correspondence between every way 
maximally specific way a world can be with a world would not be vacuous - it 
would express a relation between two different concepts. Lewis denies drawing a 
distinction between every maximally specific way a world can be and worlds 
                                                          
9 Ibid., 86. 
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themselves on grounds of parsimony10. One might think this is not a strong reason 
to deny the drawing of the distinction- after all, if it helps us in rendering the 
above expression a meaningful one, a fleshing out of such a distinction would be 
warranted. 
The drawing of the distinction requires us to cash out exactly what a 
maximally specific way a world can be is, without defining it in terms of a 
spatiotemporally isolated world that exists in the same way this actual world does. 
That is a challenge in itself, because we would need to draw and motivate a 
distinction between a world and a way the world can be when it seems those two 
concepts are just different ways of expressing the same thing. It is not clear how 
such a fine distinction may be drawn or motivated, and Lewis shies away from 
this strategy probably because of this reason. 
Lewis provides some examples of ways to draw the distinction between a 
maximally specific way a world can be and worlds themselves; they are shown to 
be inadequate ways to render expressions of plenitude non-tautological. 
We may define a maximally specific way a world can be as a property of 
worlds, and cash out a property as a set of all its instances. Assuming that there 
are no indiscernible worlds, for every maximally specific way the world can be, 
there is one world that corresponds to it. This means every maximally specific 
way a world can be is a unit set- that is to say, a set with only one element.  If we 
think there are indiscernible worlds, then it is not a unit set, but just a set. 
                                                          
10 Ibid, 86. 
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However, this is still an unsatisfactory way of drawing the distinction that does 
nothing to express the fact of plenitude, because “for every maximally specific 
way a world can be, there is a world where that way a world can be is the case” 
now just means the sets or unit sets that are ways a world can be are non-empty. 
Their non-emptiness does not imply a plenitude of them, which is what we want 
to express11. 
We may define a maximally specific way a world can be as an 
equivalence class under indiscernibility. If we think there are indiscernible 
worlds, then there are multiple elements in the equivalences classes that are 
maximally specific ways a world can be. If we think there are no indiscernible 
worlds, then there is only one element in each of the equivalences classes that are 
maximally specific ways a world can be. In any case, this is an inadequate way of 
expressing plenitude, because like above, this just means the equivalence classes 
are non-empty, and this does not imply the plenitude of worlds we want to 
express. 
 A different strategy would be to express plenitude by modifying the above 
statement into “for every maximally specific way we think a world can be, there is 
a world where that way a world can be is the case”. The addition of “we think”12 
renders the expression non-tautological, but Lewis thinks it endorses anything we 
think off-hand as possible13. This means Lewis thinks having conceivability imply 
                                                          
11 Ibid., 87. 
12 We take “think” to be synonymous with “conceive” in this case. 
13 David Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds., 87 
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possibility is not a good way to cash out the expression of plenitude because it 
does not rule out worlds which he does not want. I think Lewis jumps the gun in 
this case- this way of rendering the expression of plenitude meaningful does not 
straightforwardly endorse anything we think is possible off-hand. Rather, what it 
endorses depends on what we take “think” to mean. 
Before I explain my claim above, let me go through one example of such a 
conceivable world Lewis does not want. It is a world which has a certain person 
having a thought that is not permitted by Lewis’s commitment to a functionalist 
view of the content of thought14. Here is Lewis’s characterisation of his 
functionalist view of the content of thought that holds across all worlds: 
“A man or a beast or a god, or anything that is a thinker at all, has a 
thought with a certain content in virtue of being in a state which occupies 
a functional role. This definitive functional role has to do with causal 
relations of that state to the thinker’s sensory input, behavioral output, and 
his other states.”15 
 An example expressing the idea noted above is this: I have the thought “I 
want a drink from the fridge” at time X. According to the functionalism Lewis 
subscribes to, this thought at time X correlates to a particular state I am in at time 
X, and I have this state because of the sensory inputs, behavioral outputs, and 
other states (e.g. the state of being thirsty) I have at the moment. Given all these 
                                                          




inputs, outputs, and other states I have at time X, it is necessarily the case that I 
have the thought “I want a drink from the fridge” at time X. I cannot have the 
thought “I’ll take a nap” in place of “I want a drink from the fridge” at time X.; 
such a world is impossible according to Lewis. However, to those of us who do 
not subscribe to the functionalist theory of thought Lewis subscribes to, it might 
seem intuitively conceivable. 
It is not clear that such a world would be something we can think about 
such that it exists according to the expression of plenitude given above. Whether 
it would be existent or not depends on how we substantiate the notion of 
conceive. We might think Z is conceivable insofar as it means Z is prima facie 
conceivable. This means Z is conceivable if it meets the criterion of 
conceivability, and such a criterion which might be cashed out in terms of Z being 
a consistent state of affairs16. If this is the notion of conceivable we use, then 
Lewis would be right that the expression of plenitude gives him worlds he does 
not want. That is because we can think of such scenarios because they are 
conceivable, and insofar as they are conceivable, a world corresponding to the 
thought exists. 
However, if we might have a different notion of what it means to be 
conceivable. We might think Z is conceivable insofar as it is negatively 
conceivable. This conception of thinkable is motivated by the intuition that what 
                                                          
16 David Chalmers, “Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?,” in Conceivability 




is conceivable is what is not ruled out by what we know or what we believe17. 
Under this conception of what being conceivable is, Lewis’s impossible scenario 
above is not conceivable to Lewis, because it is ruled out by his commitment to 
analytic functionalism with regard to contents of thought. So it seems this 
conception of what is conceivable would give Lewis the worlds he wants, and 
does not include Lewis’s undesirable worlds like the one noted above. 
 Given this conclusion, it seems expressing plenitude using “for every 
maximally specific way we think a world can be, there is a world where that way 
a world can be” is not clearly undesirable for Lewis, as it only endorses desirable 
worlds according to particular notions of what is thinkable. However, the 
challenge for this strategy is picking out and justifying the correct notion of what 
is thinkable in the first place, and seeing if it gives us the worlds we want. That is 
a challenge we will note but not tackle in this thesis. It seems to me that this 
strategy of expressing plenitude is not a failure to be dismissed off-hand as Lewis 
is quick to do. In fact, in the face of the failure of the principle of recombination 
(establishing this is the purpose of this paper), this might be the most promising 








1.1.2 The Principle of Recombination as a Flawed Expression of Plenitude 
 
Given the inadequacy of the above ways of rendering expressions of 
plenitude meaningful, the principle of recombination is Lewis’s preferred solution 
to the issue. In this section I provide an analysis of the principle of recombination. 
I also discuss some problems with the principle of recombination; I argue that it is 
not clear whether other modal theories can adopt the principle of recombination in 
a straightforward way. 
Lewis’s own characterisation of the unrestricted principle of 
recombination is rough: 
[A]nything can coexist with anything else, at least provided they occupy 
distinct spatiotemporal positions. Likewise, anything can fail to coexist 
with anything else18. 
According to this rough account of the unrestricted principle of 
recombination, “anything” may literally be taken to be any object. There are 
worlds where said objects coexist, and there are also worlds where said objects 
fail to coexist. Lewis gives the example of the dragon and the rabbit. Insofar as 
they are objects, there is at least one world where they coexist with each other by 
occupying distinct positions that come into spatiotemporal relations with each 
other. It is also possible that they fail to coexist with each other- there is at least 
one world where there are either dragons or rabbits (but not both) and they do not 
                                                          
18 David Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds, 88. 
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come into spatiotemporal relations with each other. Failure to meet this condition 
expressed by the principle of recombination results in what Lewis calls a failure 
of plenitude. That means a failure to capture possibilities we want our theory to 
say exists. 
However, cashing out “anything” as “any object” is not theoretically 
tenable. If we allow that, then prima facie, we permit trans-world instantiation. To 
permit trans-world instantiation is to permit particular objects to instantiate across 
multiple worlds, such that they exist in multiple worlds. For example, someone 
who is committed to trans-world instantiation may analyse the sentence “it is 
possible that the rabbit is hungry” in this particular way: the object that is the 
rabbit in the other possible world is the very same rabbit that exists in this world. 
According to Lewis, particular dragons or rabbits do not instantiate trans-
world- their counterparts instantiate trans-world. This is in line with Lewis’s 
commitment to counterpart theory, and it is required to maintain the coherence of 
Lewis’s conception of worlds as causally isolated spatiotemporal regions. Let us 
make this clear by considering this scenario: let us assume it is true the dragon Z 
coexists with the rabbit Y. Then by the rough principle of recombination laid out 
above, the sentence “possibly, the dragon Z does not coexist with the rabbit Y” is 
true too. There is a question of whether the dragon Z in the possible world where 
Z does not coexist with Y is the dragon Z of the current world. Lewis’s answer is 
an empathetic “No”. The dragon Z in the possible world is a duplicate of the 
dragon Z in the current world, and they are not the same dragon. To allow for 
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them to be the same dragon would be to allow for objects to instantiate trans-
world, and this would violate Lewis’s assertion that worlds are causally isolated 
from one another- because particular objects can interact with other objects in 
different worlds. 
You might think the issue might be resolved by conceptualising 
“anything” as “any counterpart”- this way, we take into account Lewis’s 
commitment to counterpart theory. Lewis thinks this is a non-starter as well. 
Lewis thinks an object Z is a counterpart of X if and only if Z possesses some 
relation of similarity to it, and the relevant kind of similarity tends to be 
extrinsic19. For example, let us imagine a scenario where some person in this 
world, X, has two counterparts, Y and Z. Y and Z might be counterparts because 
they are similar to the X of this actual world in terms of origin: Y and Z are 
similar to X in the sense they are the first child of a duplicate of the father and 
mother of X in this world. So for counterparts Y and Z to instantiate, the 
condition that they are the first child of the duplicate of the father and mother of X 
must be met- that is the condition that makes them counterparts of X in the first 
place. But if we want Y and Z to instantiate in the same world, counterpart Z is 
not compossible with counterpart Y because only one of them can be the first 
child of the duplicate of the father and mother of X, and so the instantiation of one 
of them would deny the other a necessary condition of his/ her instantiation. 
Lewis does not use this particular example, but his general worry is that 
                                                          
19 Ibid., 88. 
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inconsistencies arising from the instantiation of the empirical conditions 
necessary for certain counterparts to be might render the existence of certain 
counterparts in the same world impossible. So Z and Y would not be compossible; 
but since conceptualising “anything” as “any counterpart” would imply it is, 
conceptualising “anything” as any counterpart” is not a fruitful way to go.  
 It is for this reason that Lewis conceives of “anything” as “any duplicate”. 
To Lewis, any duplicate can coexist with any duplicate. A duplicate of X is just 
something that possesses the intrinsic properties of X- in looser terms, it is a copy. 
In instantiating duplicates, we do not need to pay heed or instantiate the 
extenuating conditions necessary for their being like we do in the case of 
counterparts. The duplicate of the dragon may co-exist with the duplicate of the 
rabbit, and the duplicate of a head may exist in some world without a body. 
There attempts to give more precise technical characterisations of the 
unrestricted principle of recombination cashed out by Lewis above (see Efird and 
Stoneham or Darby and Watson). These characterisations attempt to cash out the 
duplicates of the unrestricted principle of recombination in terms of objects and 
their spatiotemporal relations, while meeting the requirements of (i) being 
expressed in a way that does not use ineliminable modal language, and (ii) being 
extensionally adequate, in the sense it should capture all the kinds of possible 
scenarios that we want, and not capture those that are undesirable20. There is 
                                                          
20 George Darby and Duncan Watson, “Lewis’s Principle of Recombination: 
Reply to Efird and Stoneham,” Dialectica 64, no. 3 (2010): 435–445, 435. 
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something to be said about whether these- or my- conceptualisations of the 
principle of recombination meet these requirements, but it will not be discussed in 
this paper. We will not concern ourselves with those formulations, and note this 
as a suitable formulation of the principle: 
The unrestricted principle of recombination states that any non-empty 
configuration of spatiotemporal relations between non-overlapping 
spatiotemporal regions corresponds to a world. 
The principle of recombination is unrestricted in the sense there is no 
restriction on the number of configurations of relations between non-overlapping 
spatiotemporal regions. We also stipulate that the spatiotemporal regions with the 
same intrinsic properties that instantiate across worlds are duplicates of each 
other. We restrict recombination to the spatiotemporal relations between 
spatiotemporal regions, and not the properties between spatiotemporal regions 
themselves so as to respect the intuition that the worlds that make up the plenitude 
of worlds are made up of a patchwork of the duplicates of the spatiotemporal 
regions of other existent worlds.  
The spatiotemporal regions which are subject to recombination all have 
consistent properties- think of them as having the property of some actual narwhal 
or horse in this actual world. This is because Lewis’s methodology bars 




Lewis thinks there are no worlds with true contradictions because 
sentences which express contradictions that are true will decompose into explicit 
contradictions of the form “P and not-P”, and “there are no stories, however 
marvelous, about which you can tell the truth by contradicting yourself”21. This 
presumes a rejection of the possibility of explicit contradictions being coherent. 
Given that worlds with true contradictions are incoherent, they are not allowed in 
his ontology. An example of a contradiction is this: let us say the sentence “At a 
world X, P and not-P” is true. Lewis assumes “at a world X” is a quantification 
restriction. It is meant to restrict scope of quantification to a particular world. 
Given such a treatment, “At a world X, P and not-P” implies “At a world X, P, 
and not: at a world X, P”, which is an explicit contradiction. So contradictions in 
other worlds will result in explicit contradictions that are incoherent. That is why 
he thinks there is no place for worlds with true contradictions, because the true 
contradictions used to express the state of affairs in those worlds will end up 
incoherent because they imply explicit contradictions. 
We might think the above line of reasoning is flawed, because “at a world 
X” is not a quantification restriction such that the move from “at a world X, not-
P” to “not: at a world X, P” is legitimate. We might think “at a world X” is a 
modal operator that indicates the sentence it quantifies over is part of a story- let 
us call such an operator a story operator. Examples of such story operators are 
“according to the Bible” or “Fred says”. In the case of story operators, the above 
                                                          
21 David Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds, 7. 
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move is not legitimate. “Fred says not-P” does not imply “not: Fred says P”. 
Lewis is aware of this nuance22. He argues that conceptualising “at a world X” as 
a story operator is undesirable because worlds are not stories according to modal 
realism, and that if worlds are stories (such that we subscribe to some form of 
linguistic ersatzism), they would run into a problem of primitive modality that 
results from the demand that these stories be consistent. 
I find this line of reasoning unconvincing, because it seems to me that the 
nature of worlds and the correct interpretation of sentence modifiers like “at a 
world X” are two different issues that need not be related. It is easy to relate them: 
it certainly makes sense for modal realism to treat “at a world X” as a restricted 
quantification restriction over particular spatiotemporal regions, insofar as worlds 
are spatiotemporal regions in modal realism. But it is not necessarily so- they are 
two distinct issues that do not need to be related in such a way. So denying a 
conception of “at a world X” as a story operator on the basis of the nature of 
worlds seems dubious to me, insofar as it presumes they are mutually dependent. 
Even if the modal metaphysics of modal realism were true, it seems that it is not 
clear there cannot be worlds with true contradictions, because we have no strong 
reason from Lewis that prevents us from interpreting sentence modifiers like “at a 
world X” as modal operators, which would prevent Lewis’s examples of true 
contradictions from decomposing into explicit contradictions. 
                                                          
22 Ibid, 7. 
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Nevertheless, because Lewis is convinced the above line of reasoning 
gives him reason to reject the existence of worlds with true contradictions, every 
spatiotemporal point with every possible combination of properties (alien or 
otherwise) is one that does not contain contradictory properties23. These are the 
existent regions whose relations with each other will be the subjects of 
recombination. This is precisely why Lewis does not require the principle of 
recombination to be cashed out in a modal way; he does not need to say only 
consistent spatiotemporal regions or objects (if you are inclined towards cashing 
out the principle of recombination in terms of objects) may be recombined, 
because his methodology automatically discounts inconsistent spatiotemporal 
regions from his ontology. 
It is useful to note that while Lewis has a reason not to cash out the 
principle of recombination using modal terms because of his methodology, others 
who seek to use it in their theories of modality may not necessarily have such a 
reason. If the other modal theory has not given reason to discount the existence of 
spatiotemporal regions or objects containing inconsistencies beforehand, then the 
principle of recombination it adopts may have to take up the task of doing so, and 
may end up using ineliminable modal language in its analysis. The rival theory’s 
principle of recombination may end up along these lines: “The unrestricted 
principle of recombination states that any configuration of relations between 
consistent spatiotemporal regions corresponds to a world”. This would be a 
                                                          
23 Ibid., 7. 
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version of the unrestricted principle of recombination that is expressed in non-
modal terms, because consistency is a modal notion. The principle would appeal 
to primitive notions of modality, and in doing so sabotage the hopes of having a 
reductive theory of modality. So contrary to Nolan’s claim that “it is relatively 
straightforward” to work out the analogues of the unrestricted principle of 
recombination used in other theories, it is not such a simple task24. Whether the 
principle of recombination may be expressed in non-modal terms depends in part 
on the other features of the modal theory it is being fit into. If the theory requires 
the principle of recombination to take up the task of discounting the existence of 
spatiotemporal regions or objects containing inconsistencies beforehand, then the 
principle will not be non-modal and thus render the theory it is part of non-
reductive. 
Moreover, it is not clear any theory of modality may benefit from the use 
of the unrestricted principle of recombination as Nolan hopes. We should note 
that the principle of recombination of modal realism is a principle stating how 
worlds are recombinations of relations between spatiotemporal regions. If a 
theory of modality does not conceptualise worlds as spatiotemporal in the first 
place, then prima facie it will have no use for the principle of recombination as it 
is cashed out by modal realism. If a theory of modality conceptualises worlds as 
spatiotemporal, then prima facie it would inherit the problems people have with 
modal realism such as its unintuitive ontology, and more importantly, the onus 
                                                          




would be on such a theory to distinguish itself from modal realism. Thus first, the 
onus is on such a theory of modality that is like Lewis’s modal realism but not 
Lewis’s modal realism must distinguish itself from Lewis’s theory in a 
substantive way; if not, it seems the only theory of modality that may employ the 
principle of recombination is modal realism. Second, it must deal with the 
problems modal realism has, such as that of a bloated ontology. Prima facie, it 
seems not a lot of theories of modality can benefit from the principle of 
recombination other than the ones that conceptualise worlds as spatiotemporal 
regions similar to modal realism, so not all theories of modality may help 
themselves to it to tackle whatever theoretical problems they might have. 
It is important to distinguish between an unrestricted form of the principle 
of recombination and a qualified one. This shall be made clear in the coming 
chapters. For now, it is enough to note that the unrestricted principle of 
recombination refers to the unrestricted formulation above, and the principle of 
recombination refers to either the qualified or unrestricted formulation of the 
principle. 
The unrestricted principle of recombination may serve as a means to 
render expressions of plenitude meaningful, because now we can analyse a 
“maximally specific way a world can be” not just in terms as a world, which 
would render the sentence vacuously true. Now, we can analyse a “maximally 
specific way a world can be” as a world that is the case as a result of the 
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application of the principle of recombination, and identify such a world as 
something that is the case. 
 
1.1.3 The Utility of the Principle of Recombination 
 
Having laid out the unrestricted principle of recombination and how it 
resolves the problem of cashing out plenitude, I go on to discuss other uses of the 
principle of recombination. Its utility is not restricted to resolving the problem 
with expressing plenitude as Lewis noted above. 
Philosophers like Efird and Stoneham motivate the need for the principle 
of recombination by noting it may serve as a way to express the range of worlds 
there are25. Efird and Stoneham think Lewis intended for the principle of 
recombination to have such a use as well- but I do not see textual evidence 
suggesting Lewis intended for the principle of recombination to be anything other 
than a way to render expressions of plenitude non-tautological and meaningful. 
Also, it seems to me Lewis is using another method to determine the range of 
worlds there is in the first place. We should note this is a markedly different 
motivation for the principle of recombination than what Lewis had in mind. They 
are different motivations. Just because the principle of recombination is a way of 
                                                          
25 Tom Stoneham and David Efird, “What Is the Principle of Recombination?,” 
Dialectica 62, no. 4 (2008): 483–94, 483. 
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rendering expressions of plenitude meaningful does not imply it is an expression 
of the range of worlds there are. 
Look at the ways of rendering expressions of plenitude meaningful 
discussed above: it is clear that defining a way worlds can be in terms of unit sets 
or equivalence classes under indiscernibility does not entail anything about the 
range of worlds there are. To say that “X is a way to render expressions of 
plenitude meaningful” is conceptually equivalent to saying that “X is an 
expression of the range of worlds there are” is to say this: if “X is a way to render 
expressions of plenitude meaningful”, then “X is an expression of the range of 
worlds there are, and vice versa”. However, a way to render expressions of 
plenitude meaningful does not entail anything about an expression of the range of 
worlds there are. The above discussion about conceptualising a way a world can 
be in terms of sets and unit classes under indiscernibility are cases in point- these 
conceptualisations do not entail a fact about the range of worlds there are. So we 
cannot say “X is a way to render expressions of plenitude meaningful” is 
conceptually equivalent to “X is an expression that determines the range of worlds 
there are”, because it is not the case that the truth of the former entails the latter.  
Thus, it is clear a way to render expressions of plenitude meaningful is not 
equivalent to a way to express the range of worlds there are. 
I am doubtful whether Lewis intended for the principle of recombination 
to be an expression of the range of worlds there are like some philosophers think. 
Lewis is a paradigm case of someone who does not use a principle to determine 
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the range of worlds there are. We may acknowledge that Lewis’s motivation for 
the principle of recombination lies in a need for a way to express the plenitude of 
worlds meaningfully, but we may also be skeptical with regard to whether Lewis 
requires the principle of recombination to determine what worlds there are in the 
first place. That is because they may be struck by Lewis’s method in determining 
what worlds there in in his ontology. He admits worlds and objects into his 
ontology on the basis of its explanatory power. If the world or object can explain 
some phenomenon that requires explanation, then it is posited as existent26. Using 
this methodology, we might not require a principle to express the range of worlds 
there are at all. This is because we would be able to determine the existential 
status of worlds based on their explanatory power instead. In this case, the 
principle of recombination does not seem to need to play the role of expressing 
the range of worlds there are- rather, it can play a more limited role of expressing 
how the worlds permitted to exist satisfy the requirement of plenitude insofar as 
they are recombined. 
Aside from the issues with textual exegesis highlighted above, this brings 
to light a more pressing issue: is the principle of recombination a good principle 
by which we may express the range of worlds there are in the first place? I think 
the answer is “no”. In the prior section’s discussion of whether other theories of 
modality may use the principle of recombination freely, I noted that if the 
principle of recombination is to take up the task of giving a full account of the 
                                                          
26 David Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds, 7. 
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range of worlds by discounting the existence of spatiotemporal regions or objects 
containing inconsistencies beforehand, then the principle will not be non-modal 
and thus render the theory it is part of non-reductive. It seems to me that if the 
principle of recombination alone is to bear the weight of determining the range of 
worlds there are in the first place, it must take up such a task. In doing so, it 
would be cashed out in non-modal terms, and thus be unacceptable in a reductive 
theory of modality. So if one’s aim is to have a reductive theory of modality, it 
seems the principle of recombination would be a poor principle to express the 
range of worlds that exist. It is not suited to this task as some think it is. 
To sum up what we have done so far, the discussion in the prior sections 
give us an analysis of the principle of recombination, and highlights the 
philosophical utility of the principle of recombination. It may be a way to express 
plenitude, or an expression of the range of worlds there are. Also, some issues 
with regard to the principle were brought forth: it is not clear whether other modal 
theories make use of the principle of recombination in a straightforward manner 
as Nolan noted. 
 
1.2.0 Analysis of the Concepts used in cashing out the Principle of 
Recombination 
 
 For the rest of this chapter, we will focus on explaining the notions used in 
defining the unrestricted principle of recombination above. I will explain the 
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precise notion of worlds and spatiotemporal regions in a way that will make sense 
of the workings of the unrestricted principle of recombination. 
 Above, I explained worlds in terms of an analogy with this actual world, 
noting worlds are just like this world in the sense they are filled with the kinds of 
objects found in this world. Now, we can provide a precise notion of world that 
will help explain how the unrestricted principle of recombination works. 
X is a world if and only if X is a collection of at least one discrete 
spatiotemporally-related spatiotemporal regions that is spatiotemporally 
isolated from other discrete collections27. 
Spatiotemporal regions are spatiotemporal regions whose nature shall be 
made explicit in the following sections. In the actual world, the spatiotemporal 
point which covers the region of the shirt I have at this moment instantiates green. 
Now think of the world X, which is the actual world with one variation- the 
spatiotemporal region which covers the region of the shirt I (or my duplicate 
counterpart, depending on your taste in theories with regard to how objects 
instantiate trans-world) have at this moment instantiates blue. The variation is just 
a recombination of the relations between spatiotemporal regions found in this 
actual world have with each other. In world X, the spatiotemporal region which 
covers the region of the shirt instantiating the green of this actual world, there is 
another spatiotemporal region which is just like my current shirt, but it 
                                                          
27 In this paper, I follow Lewis in holding that a region not containing 
spatiotemporal regions is not a world. 
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instantiates the blue of the actual world instead. This is an example of how the 
world X is a non-actual world whose existence is established through the 
unrestricted principle of recombination. 
 
1.2.1 Ontology of Spatiotemporal Regions 
 
 In the following sections, I will focus on discussing what the 
spatiotemporal regions used in defining the unrestricted principle of 
recombination are. I will begin with a discussion of their ontology. 
Lewis notes we may have three different conceptions of spatiotemporal 
regions28. The first is the dualistic conception insofar as it makes a distinction 
between the regions of space-time that make up a spatiotemporal point, and the 
occupants of the region that make up the spatiotemporal point. We may have 
distance relations between region and region, occupant and occupant, or occupant 
and region. The second is a monistic conception that holds just the existence of 
regions of space-time, and conceptualises the occupants of space-time such as 
electrons or charge as parts of regions of space-time. The third is a monistic 
conception that holds just the existence of occupants of space-time. Lewis thinks 
that modal realism may be consistent with all of these theories of spatiotemporal 
regions, but he favours the first monistic view29. 
                                                          
28 David Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds, 76. 
29 Ibid., 76. 
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 Lewis does not favour the dualistic view because it is uneconomical, 
insofar as it holds a difference in kind between occupants and regions of space-
time30. Ostensibly, if one holds such there is a fundamental difference in kind 
between occupants and regions, one has to clarify the difference- that is what is 
uneconomical about the view. However, he notes modal realism does not need to 
presume any of the three views on the ontology of spatiotemporal regions- it can 
be take up any of the three positions regardless of his own preferences. 




                                                          
30 Ibid, 76. 
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1.2.2 Relations Between Spatiotemporal Regions- Distance as Paradigm 
Relation 
 
 Following the discussion of the ontology of spatiotemporal regions above, 
I shall explain the notion of the relation that (iii) holds between the spatiotemporal 
regions in any world, and (iv) is used in defining the principle of recombination in 
terms of one relation that is present in every world. 
Spatiotemporal regions stand in spatiotemporal relations to each other. If 
worlds consist in sets of spatiotemporal regions, it is necessary to say how those 
regions are related to one another. There are many kinds of spatiotemporal 
relations. Kicking is one of them- I kick the chair is a spatiotemporal relation 
relating me and the chair in a particular way. The paradigmatic spatiotemporal 
relation would be one of distance between two spatiotemporal regions. It is 
paradigmatic because it is the one relation we can guarantee to hold across all 
worlds. Some relations may not instantiate in some worlds. For example, in a 
world with no living things, there might be no objects that kick each other. Thus, 
the relation of kicking would not be instantiated in such worlds. Distance is not 
such a contingent relation. Distance is instantiated in all worlds insofar as all 
worlds have spatiotemporal regions. By the prior definition of worlds as a 
configuration of at least one spatiotemporal region that is spatiotemporally 
isolated from other collections, all worlds will have the relation of distance. So 
this makes it a suitable candidate for discussing relations that hold between 
spatiotemporal region, insofar as it is one that is ever-present insofar as the region 
that make up worlds exist. 
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We can model metric distance mathematically31. For the sake of 
simplicity, we may say (1) a spatiotemporal region is represented as Cartesian 
coordinates (x, y, z), with time being a fourth dimension (t), and that it is a part of 
a metric space, which is an ordered pair, <A, 𝛿>. 𝛿 is a distance function, where 
𝛿: A x A → ℝ such that a, b, c ∈ A: 
(2)𝛿 (a, a) = 0 
(3) 𝛿 (a, b) > 0 if a ≠ b 
(4) 𝛿 (a, b) = 𝛿 (b, a) 
The elements in A could be the Cartesian coordinates used to model 
spatiotemporal regions, and A is the set of all such regions in a world. (2) 
expresses the requirement that every region is zero distance from itself. (3) 
expresses the requirement that the distance between two regions is more than 0, if 
the two regions are not the same. (4) expresses the requirement that the relation of 
distance is symmetric: the distance between region a and region b is equal to the 
distance between region b and region a. 
This mathematical model captures intuitions about metric space. (2) to (4) 
may be considered the minimal conditions any theory about the distance relation 
between space must meet, and we will assume any theory about spatiotemporal 
regions should be consistent with these minimal conditions. 
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1.2.3 The Problem of Distance 
 
The conception of distance noted above in (1) to (4) may be taken to be a 
solution to a problem regarding conceptualising distance that Lewis noted32. The 
problem is noted below. 
Mathematical models of metric space meet the minimal conditions above, 
and more. We shall note two models of distance undergirded by different theories 
of physics, and show how this is a problem for Lewis’s modal realism. Lewis 
notes there is a problem giving an analysis of distance, given he allows for 
accessible worlds where scientific laws differ33. In a world undergirded by 
Newtonian physics, let us call it model N, spatiotemporal regions are related by 
two kinds of distance relations- spatial distance and temporal distance. In a world 
undergirded by a relativistic physics, let us call it model R, spatiotemporal regions 
are related only by one distance relation. It is either a temporal relation, a spatial 
relation, or it may be zero distance that is neither temporal nor spatial. The 
problem now is whether in N and R, (5) these different ways of modelling 
spatiotemporal relations are really just different ways of expressing the same kind 
of relation, or (6) are they really expressing different relations. If (5), then there is 
no issue- because we have a notion of distance that is common across all worlds. 
                                                          




If (6), we have a problem, because now we would need clarification on what we 
mean by a spatiotemporal relation of distance. 
It is not immediately clear whether (5) or (6) is true. If (5) is the case, 
Model N and R map onto the same ontological substance, such that they are just 
different ways of expressing the same kind of spatiotemporal relations, and the 
debate would shift into a discussion of which model is the best representation for 
our needs. 
If (6) is the case, it seems we have two analyses of the distance relation, 
one for each model. We need to find a way to generalise them into a single 
distance relation such that distance is not an unnatural relation insofar as it is 
disjunctive, or we need to find another spatiotemporal relation that is natural. 
There is no clear answer to either approach. Lewis sketches these requirements he 
has for the hoped-for solution for (6), but he offers no positive solution himself. 
So this is actually a problem for Lewis – albeit one he has flagged himself. The 
conception of distance noted above in (1) to (4) may be taken to be a solution to 
the problem of distance, insofar as it is a general enough conception of distance 
that both Relativistic and Newtonian conceptions of distance hold. This would 
qualify as a generalisation of Relativistic and Newtonian conceptions of distance 
into a single distance relation. 
This solution may be problematic if one thinks (1) to (4) are necessary but 
insufficient conditions for being distance. If this is the case, Lewis is stuck with 
regard to the problem of conceptualising distance. 
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It might be objected that this problem might be settled by positing distance 
as a primitive relation; after all, the problem of distance has no bearing on the 
reductivity of his theory of modality. However, there is an issue that must be dealt 
with before this strategy can be considered. Using an unanalysable concept of 
distance as that which instantiates across worlds does not do away with the 
relativistic and Newtonian conceptions of distance, and we would need additional 
arguments to explain why the unanalysable concept of distance is the correct 
concept of distance that should be deployed, rather than the other two. 
 
1.2.4 The Size of the Smallest Spatiotemporal Region 
 
In the following sections, I seek to give an analysis of the size of the 
smallest spatiotemporal region and its implication on the minimum number of 
spatiotemporal regions a world may have. In this particular context, by size, I 
mean the metric dimensions of the space-time region/ space-time region and 
occupants/ occupants that are the spatiotemporal region.  
 The conception of the size of the smallest spatiotemporal region we shall 
defend is this: 
The size of the smallest spatiotemporal region is the dimensions of any 
bounded space-time region. 
Let me insert one qualifier for the above definition. As we noted, there are 
different ways of conceptualising the ontology of spatiotemporal regions. Given a 
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particular ontology, the definition of the size of the smallest spatiotemporal region 
will be slightly altered. The dualistic conception would say the size of the smallest 
spatiotemporal region are the dimensions of any bounded space-time region and 
the occupants within the region. The monistic conception that holds a 
spatiotemporal region is a region of space would say the size of the smallest 
spatiotemporal regions are the dimensions of any bounded space-time region. The 
second monistic conception that holds a spatiotemporal region is an occupant 
itself would say the size of the smallest spatiotemporal region is determined with 
reference to the dimensions of some particular occupant. One upshot of the 
following discussion is the second monistic conception will be shown to be an 
untenable one. So contrary to what Lewis’s thought that all three conceptions of 
the ontology of spatiotemporal regions are plausible, I contend only the first 
monistic conception and the dualistic conception are, for reasons shown below. 
Let me explain why the above formulation of the size of spatiotemporal 
regions is true, by showing how two ways of modelling the size of spatiotemporal 
regions as particular bounded space-time regions do not work. The two ways are 
as such: the size of spatiotemporal regions may be defined according to stipulated 
spatiotemporal dimensions, or they may be defined with reference to the smallest 
particle. 
Given the lack of success defining modelling the size of spatiotemporal 
regions as the dimension of some particular bounded space-time region, we will 
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have reason to think the size of spatiotemporal region are not particular bounded 
space-time regions. It will be the dimensions of any bounded space-time region. 
 
1.2.5 Size of the Smallest Spatiotemporal Region as Stipulated 
Spatiotemporal Dimensions 
 
Conceptualising the size of the smallest spatiotemporal regions as 
stipulated spatiotemporal dimensions would be to commit oneself to the 
controversial view that there cannot be space-times smaller than that of some 
particular smallest distance- that of the stipulated spatiotemporal dimension. That 
is because the smallest world would contain only one spatiotemporal region, and 
it would be the size of that particular stipulated spatiotemporal dimension. It is an 
open question whether actual space-time has a least distance or not. For example, 
debates go on with regard to whether the Planck interval is such a least distance. 
If we are to commit to the view that there cannot be space-times smaller than that 
of the stipulated spatiotemporal dimension, then we would be answering this open 
question with a “yes”, and it seems we will need further grounds to say why the 
answer is so. This is the challenge laid out for people who want to conceptualise 
the size of spatiotemporal regions as stipulated spatiotemporal dimensions. 
 
 
1.2.6 Size of the Smallest Spatiotemporal Region defined with Reference to 




Let us say we define a spatiotemporal region with reference to the smallest 
particle. We require a bit of disambiguation here. The three theories of the 
ontology of spatiotemporal regions would differ in how they use the smallest 
particle to define a spatiotemporal region. The dualistic conception would say the 
particle qua object and the region of space it occupies is the spatiotemporal 
region. The monistic conception that holds that a spatiotemporal region is a region 
of space would say the region occupied by the smallest particle is the 
spatiotemporal region. The second monistic conception that holds that a 
spatiotemporal region is an object itself would say the smallest particle is the 
spatiotemporal region. We just need to know defining a spatiotemporal region 
with reference to the smallest particle will result in different formulations 
depending on the ontology of spatiotemporal regions we adopt. Nonetheless, this 
will not avoid the following criticism of this conception of the size of the smallest 
spatiotemporal regions.  
We might imagine that worlds can be limited in size insofar as a world 
might have a limited number of such particles. I have two reasons against this 
conception of the smallest spatiotemporal region. Notice that if we do have such a 
stipulation, as above in 2.1.4, we would technically have some distances that 
cannot be expressed. Insofar as distance is expressed by a metric function (𝛿: A x 
A → ℝ.) that gives us the distance between spatiotemporal regions (in this case, 
the smallest natural particles), distances smaller than the spatiotemporal region 
cannot be expressed, as above. Let us say we want to measure the distance that is 
half the circumference of the smallest natural point. We would not be able to do 
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so if we have a mathematical model of distance as relations between the 
coordinates of spatiotemporal regions. 
Also, think of a world that is infinite in size, completely occupied by one 
giant particle. Technically, this is the smallest particle, but the size of the world in 
terms of distance between two regions cannot be expressed insofar as there is 
nothing to come in relation to the giant particle. The only distance relation we 
would be able to express is the distance between this giant particle and itself, 
which is zero. Intuitively this is incorrect. We would probably think that there are 
many distances that may be measured in such a world, insofar that it is infinite in 
size. 
One upshot of the above argument is that contrary to Lewis’s claim that all 
three conceptions of the ontology of spatiotemporal regions are theoretically 
feasible, issues regarding the size of spatiotemporal regions give us reason to 
reject the second monistic conception that holds a spatiotemporal region is an 
object itself, leaving us with two options with regard to the ontology. That is 
because if we define spatiotemporal regions as occupants, we would theoretically 
not be able to measure distance in an intuitive way in worlds where the only 
occupant in the world is one huge particle. 
 
1.2.7 The Most Conservative Estimate of the Cardinality of Sets of 




Given the size of the smallest spatiotemporal regions is any bounded 
space-time region such that spatiotemporal regions are as small as we may carve 
them, I contend the most conservative and defensible number of spatiotemporal 
regions any world has will be the cardinality of the continuum. In modelling the 
intuition of spatiotemporal regions being as small as we may carve them given the 
problems with modelling spatiotemporal regions as particular dimensions, we 
express the number of spatiotemporal regions in any world as being equivalent to 
the cardinality of the continuum: . 
If we allow spatiotemporal regions to be in one of two states, that of being 
occupied or unoccupied, then we have this number of worlds: 2𝑐. Lewis thinks 
that the unrestricted principle of recombination will not give us empty worlds. An 
empty world is just a world devoid of spatiotemporal regions. Insofar as worlds 
are defined as collections of at least one spatiotemporal region, the null set would 
not be a world. So we would have (2𝑐 − 1) worlds- and that is just 2𝑐 worlds. 
We might think of this as the smallest plausible estimate of the number of 
worlds there are. Incidentally, Lewis seems to think so too- he gives the number 
of possible worlds as the lower bound of beth two, which is just 2𝑐34. I think this 
is also the most conservative estimate, because we have not factored in the 
possibility of duplicate worlds, or different ways in which spatiotemporal regions 
may be occupied. 
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With this discussion, we will have provided a disambiguation of the 
unrestricted principle of recombination and the notion of worlds and 
spatiotemporal regions that are involved in defining it. We have noted the 
possible ontologies of spatiotemporal regions, argued for the implausibility for the 
second monistic conception based on our discussion of the size of spatiotemporal 






Chapter 2: The Unfeasibility of the Unrestricted Principle of Recombination 
 
2.0.0 Lewis’s Two Reasons Against the Unrestricted Principle of 
Recombination 
 
 The prior sections disambiguate the terms used in defining the unrestricted 
principle of recombination, so now we have an understanding of the concepts 
underpinning it. In the following sections, I argue that the unrestricted principle of 
recombination is untenable, and that Lewis is right in eschewing it in favour of a 
qualified principle of recombination. 
I begin by discussing Lewis’s two reasons for denying the unrestricted 
principle of recombination in favour of a qualified one, and show why at least one 
of his worries about its problems are justified. First, we shall provide a definition 
of the qualified principle of recombination: 
The qualified principle of recombination states that any configuration of 
relations between spatiotemporal regions drawn among worlds 
corresponds to a world, size and space permitting. 
Lewis thinks that these two reasons are sufficient to reject the unrestricted 
principle of recombination in favour of the qualified principle of recombination35. 
We might imagine this formulation is innocuous. We might think the proviso 
“size and shape permitting” permits space-time to be infinitely recombined such 
that we may have a space-time of a limitless size. We might imagine it is put in 
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place just in case science uncovers a limit to the size of space-time. The proviso is 
not innocuous in this manner. Lewis is clear that the proviso needs to be backed 
by a well-motivated (i.e. scientific) restriction on the size of space-time, or modal 
realism is “in serious trouble”36. Lewis suggests that the size restriction come in 
the form of a restriction upon the dimensionality of space- perhaps we would be 
restricted to only four-dimensional worlds, or finite-dimensional worlds. It is clear 
that the qualified principle of recombination implies the size and shape of space-
time has some hard limit- it is not a just-in-case measure. 
Lewis’s motivates the qualified version of the principle by denying the 
cogency of the unrestricted principle of recombination. He appeals to the 
dubiousness of allowing a principle meant to express plenitude to imply a thesis 
about space-time, and a paradox raised by Forrest and Armstrong. In the 
following sections, we will discuss his doubts with regard to the dubiousness of 
the implications of the principle of recombination, and the paradox raised by 
Forrest and Armstrong in light of Nolan’s discussion on the issue. Nolan thinks 
that the unrestricted principle of recombination is cogent, and we should use it 
rather than the qualified version of the principle.  
First, I will argue that Lewis’s reasons for denying the unrestricted 
principle of recombination on the grounds of dubious implications is a sufficient 
reason to deny the theoretical plausibility of the unrestricted principle of 
recombination. Then, given the theoretical plausibility of the unrestricted 
                                                          
36 Ibid., 103. 
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principle of recombination, we will go on to investigate Nolan’s contention that 
the Forrest and Armstrong paradox Lewis noted as a reason against the 
unrestricted principle of recombination is not a good reason to deny it. I will 
argue that Nolan’s attempt to salvage the unrestricted principle of recombination 
does not really work. In doing so, we will have established that the unrestricted 
principle of recombination leads to the paradox that Forrest and Armstrong noted, 
and it is not a cogent metaphysical principle. 
 
2.1.0 The Dubiousness of the Implication of the Principle of Recombination 
 
 In this section I discuss Lewis’s objection to the theoretical plausibility of 
the unrestricted principle of recombination using an appeal to the dubiousness of 
how a principle meant to make sense of expressions of plenitude implies claims 
about the largest possible size of space-time. Modal realism coupled with an 
unrestricted principle of recombination implies that there is no limit to the largest 
possible size of space-time37. That is because if worlds correspond to any 
recombination of the relations between spatiotemporal regions, an unrestricted 
application of recombination will not limit the size of the worlds being formed. 
For example, there can be worlds where this actual world is duplicated ad 
infinitum within the same world, resulting in an infinite space-time. 
                                                          
37 Ibid., 101. 
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Lewis is uncomfortable with the fact that the principle generates a proof of 
the largest possible size of space-time being limitless. 
“However, I insisted on qualifying the principle [of recombination] with 
the proviso ‘size and shape permitting’. The reason I gave for the proviso- 
and it seems to me a sufficient reason on its own- was that without it, the 
principle would deliver proofs that there are very large space-times, since 
if we had a class of more than continuum many possible individuals, they 
could not be copied into any merely continuum-sized space-time; 
however, ‘it seems very fishy if we begin with a principle that is meant to 
express plenitude about how space-time might be occupied, and we find 
our principle transforming itself unexpectedly so as to yield consequences 
about the largest possible size of space-time itself.’”38 
He thinks it is troubling that a principle meant to make expressions of 
plenitude meaningful turns out to imply a metaphysical thesis about the largest 
possible size of space-time. This is the first reason he proffers against the 
unrestricted principle of recombination. He thinks the fact that the unrestricted 
principle of recombination is true implies something that is beyond the scope of 
what it is intended for is sufficient to reject it. 
However, if this alone is taken seriously as a reason for denying the 
unrestricted principle of recombination, then it would be taken as a reason for 
denying the qualified principle of recombination as well. That is because the truth 
of the qualified principle of recombination implies something beyond the scope of 
what it was intended for too. Like the unrestricted version of the principle, it is 
meant to make sense of expressions of plenitude, but the truth of the qualified 
principle of recombination implies the metaphysical thesis that space-time is 
limited. Just like the unrestricted version, it implies a strong conclusion about the 
                                                          
38 Ibid., 101. 
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nature of space-time’s size. If the unrestricted principle of recombination’s 
implication with regard to the infinitude of space-time is “fishy”, then ostensibly 
the qualified principle’s implication with regard to the limited nature of space-
time should be equally fishy. 
So if we take this reason as a sufficient reason for denying the unrestricted 
principle of recombination, then it is a sufficient reason for denying the qualified 
principle of recombination too39. But this is definitely what Lewis does not want- 
this kind of reasoning results in a conclusion that is too strong, because it rules out 
the tenability of the principle of recombination altogether. 
A more pressing issue might be whether this is a good, definitive reason 
for denying the unrestricted principle of recombination in the first place. I think it 
is inconclusive. The problem lies in how we treat surprising implications. Do we 
accept them as true implications insofar as the unrestricted principle of 
recombination is the best (and therefore reasonable to think it is true) way to make 
sense of expressions of plenitude, or do we reject the principle of recombination 
on the basis of this surprising implication? Lewis favoured rejecting the principle 
of recombination because of its surprising implication. A further discussion of 
why this is “fishy”, and why it implies space-time is not infinite is what is 
required for Lewis to secure the success of the argument. He does not do so, and 
so the success of the argument is suspect in the first place. 
                                                          
39 Ibid., 102. 
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Thus, it is not clear Lewis’s objection to the theoretical plausibility of the 
unrestricted principle of recombination using an appeal to the dubiousness of it 
implies claims about the largest possible size of space-time is a good one. He 
needs to say more about why it is dubious for the argument to be successful. In 
the next section, I show how Nolan gives us reason to think we should take the 
Modus Ponens argument to be true; he gives us reason to think there is nothing 
dubious about the unrestricted principle of recombination implying that the largest 
possible size of space-time has no limit because there is an independent argument 
for it. 
 
2.1.1 Denying the Maximum Possible Size of Space-Time 
 
 In this section I discuss how Nolan has a response to what Lewis argued. 
Nolan argues that there is no limit on the largest possible size of space-time, so 
there is no need to resort to any versions of the principle of recombination other 
than the unrestricted one40. Contra Lewis, who claims that the unrestricted 
principle of recombination should not give us results that have implications on the 
largest possible size of space-time, Nolan uses philosophical arguments to give us 
independent reason to think there is no limit on the largest possible size of space-
time, and that the implication is acceptable- even desirable. If this is successful, 
then the unrestricted principle of recombination’s implication that there is no limit 
                                                          
40 Daniel Nolan, “Recombination Unbound.”, 257. 
51 
 
on the largest possible size of space-time would be acceptable, paving the way for 
the use of the unrestricted principle of recombination as Nolan wanted. 
 Nolan is understandably cautious in providing his argument for the 
rejection of the thesis that there is a maximum possible size of space-time. It is a 
subject about which most of us have weak intuitions. Nevertheless, Nolan tries; I 
will provide the argument Nolan thinks does “have some bite”41. Nolan argues 
that there is no maximum possible size of space-time by making us imagine a 
scenario where the largest possible size of space-time is limited, and pointing out 
what he deems a counter-intuitive fact. 
First, he presumes for the sake of argument that the largest possible size of 
space-time is limited. Space-time and/ or the objects in it will be related by some 
kind of spatiotemporal external relation like distance, although Nolan concedes 
that it may be a relation that is “analogously spatiotemporal”, or even alien. Nolan 
notes an implication of the limited size of space-time is that we would have a 
limited number of instances of such world-uniting external spatiotemporal 
relations in that particular world. Nolan thinks this implication “seems mysterious 
even by the murky standards of metaphysical theories”, and thus the presumption 
that the largest possible size of space-time is limited should be rejected42. 
Essentially, his argument against there being a maximum size of space-time is to 
use an intuition pump with regard to limitations on external relations relating 
                                                          




objects in any world. He is hoping we would have the intuition that to have a 
limitation on the number of relations a world can contain is problematic. 
 So in the final analysis, it seems all we have is an intuition clash. Both 
Lewis and Nolan agree that if the unrestricted principle of recombination is true, 
then there is no limit on the size of space-time. However, Lewis thinks it is not the 
case that there is no limit on the size of space-time because it is not something 
that is supposed to be implied by the principle- he has the unsubstantiated 
intuition that it is “fishy”. That is how he gets to the conclusion that the 
unrestricted principle of recombination is false. Nolan contends we have 
independent reasons to think there is no limit in the first place, so the fact that the 
unrestricted principle of recombination implies it is not a strike against the 
principle itself- his reasons for thinking so rest on an intuition itself. That is why 
he accepts the unrestricted principle of recombination is true insofar as it can do 
the theoretical work it is meant to do, and it implies something desirable. It seems 
to me that we have a stalemate, insofar as both conclusions are reached through 
intuitions that are not clearly true. 
As such, it seems to me that arguing for or against the theoretical 
plausibility of the unrestricted principle of recombination in this way is 
undesirable, insofar as it is inconclusive, and self-defeating, as its success will 
mean Lewis has to deny the qualified principle of recombination as well. I think 
the second reason Lewis provides to reject the theoretical plausibility of 
unrestricted principle of recombination is a much stronger one- Lewis contends 
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the assumption of the restricted principle of recombination results in paradox. 
Once again, Nolan gives us reason to think it does not. The next section will cover 
the debate. 
 
2.2.0 Forrest and Armstrong’s Paradox 
 
The first reason Lewis provided against the theoretical plausibility of the 
unrestricted principle of recombination is inconclusive because it is self-defeating 
insofar as its success results in the denial of the qualified principle he wants, and 
its line of reasoning is contentious as Nolan shows with his world intuitions. 
This gives us reason to investigate whether Lewis’s second reason for 
denying the use of the unrestricted principle of recombination works. The 
problem was raised by Forrest and Armstrong. They highlighted a paradoxical 
implication of the unrestricted principle of recombination. I will use the version of 
Forrest and Armstrong’s argument considered by Nolan. As Nolan thinks the 
unrestricted principle of recombination is acceptable, he does not think Forrest 
and Armstrong’s argument for the paradox is sound. Forrest and Armstrong’s 
argument for the paradox- followed by a discussion of it- is cast below43: 
(1) We assume that there is an aggregate of all worlds (A). 
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(2) There is Giganto. Giganto is a world that contains distinct duplicates of 
all the worlds in the aggregate, and Giganto is part of the aggregate of all 
worlds. 
(3) For any world X which is part of A, X has N electrons. There will be 
some property F-ness (it may be relational) which each electron in X may 
or may not have, and may or may not have it independently of whether the 
other electrons in X have it. 
(4) For each subset of the N electrons, it will be possible that precisely the 
electrons in that subset that have the property F-ness. 
(5) For any world X, there will be at least 2𝑁 worlds containing electrons. 
(6) Insofar as Giganto contains duplicates of all worlds, Giganto will 
contain at least 2𝑁 electrons. 
(7) Giganto cannot be equal to any worlds X which is part of A, insofar as 
the above reasoning at (1) to (6) will guarantee Giganto will always have 
more electrons than any world X. 
(8) So Giganto is not a part of the aggregate of all worlds. 
(9) By reductio, there is no aggregate of all worlds. 
It is clear the application of the unrestricted principle of recombination in 
this context will generate paradoxes regarding any aggregate of objects we 
stipulate. (1) is taken as an intuitive assumption- there is an aggregate of all 
worlds we consider. Here is an alternative reason to accept that there is an 
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aggregate of all worlds: (1) also follows from a commitment to the axiom of 
unrestricted composition44. 
Also, if we presume (2) follows from the unrestricted principle of 
recombination, then for any aggregate of worlds there is a world that contains 
distinct duplicates of all the worlds in the aggregate, and this world- Giganto- is 
part of the aggregate. Giganto must be in the aggregate of worlds since it is a 
world. 
According to Nolan, (3) is contentious. He thinks existence of such a 
property is dubious, because it is not clear what kind of property can meet the 
conditions of being F-ness, as we shall show below. Nolan also notes that the 
principle of recombination does not imply the existence of a property F-ness that 
may or may not be had by any electron (or natural object), and may or may not be 
had independently of whether other objects have it or not- I think he is correct.  
 Let us go beyond what is stated in (3), and see that F-ness must be an 
extrinsic property. Extrinsic properties are properties objects have by virtue of 
their relation to other objects45. Electrons are duplicates of each other, so all 
electrons have identical intrinsic properties. Let us assume F-ness is an intrinsic 
property of electrons46. If F-ness is an intrinsic property of electrons, then that 
                                                          
44 Achille Varzi, “Mereology,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, February 
13, 2016, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mereology/. 
45 David Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds, 61. 
46 Intrinsic properties are properties objects have by virtue of being themselves 
(Lewis 1986, 61). If F-ness is an intrinsic property of electrons, then all electrons 
have F-ness across all worlds, given electrons are duplicates. 
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means it is possible for there to be a world where an electron has F-ness, while 
another electron does not (given (2)). So we have the conclusion that all electrons 
have F-ness across all worlds, and across all worlds some electrons do not have F-
ness. This is a contradiction. Thus, by reductio, F-ness is not an intrinsic property 
of electrons- it must be an extrinsic property. 
A clear candidate for F-ness is the extrinsic property of having distance x 
from other some other object. But distance is a symmetric relation. F-ness is not; 
F-ness can be possessed by an electron independent of whether another electron 
has it or not. So it is not a symmetric relation, insofar as it is possible for one of 
the relata in the relation to have it, while the other does not. So F is not distance. 
It must be some asymmetric spatiotemporal relation, and it is not clear what it 
could be. Here is one suggestion for a suitable candidate for F-ness: it might be 
the extrinsic property of being at rest. This is a property spatiotemporal objects 
like electrons have that is dependent on factors external to them. Electrons may 
also be at rest independent of whether another electron is or not. So this might be 
a candidate for F-ness. 
The problem with finding a suitable candidate for F-ness led to Nolan’s 
cautious skepticism about (3). But just because distance or some other property is 
not a suitable candidate does not imply there is no property that behaves like F-
ness. It might just be an unintuitive candidate, or an “analogously spatiotemporal 
relation”. Or if I am correct, then the property of being at rest may play the role, 
and the issue is settled. Even if it is not, absence of evidence is not evidence of 
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absence. Since we have no particularly strong reasons for denying (3), we will 
permit (3), as Nolan does. 
(4) is true by virtue of (2) and the unrestricted principle of recombination. 
(5) is supposed to be true because given there are two states every electron 
in X can be in- either possessing F-ness or not- there are 2𝑁 worlds that 
containing electrons, because each world corresponds to exactly one subset where 
the electron(s) in that subset possess F-ness. Nolan thinks (5) is false. Let us see 
why with the aid of the chart below. 
 














W1 Has-F No-F No-F No-F No-F No-F … 
W2 No-F Has-F No-F No-F No-F No-F … 
W3 No-F No-F Has-F No-F No-F No-F … 
… … … … … … … … 
 
Using the chart as a visual aid, Nolan thinks that the principle of 
recombination does not guarantee that worlds that have just one electron 
possessing F-ness should correspond to multiple worlds (e.g. W1, W2, W3…) 
rather than just one. That is because these electrons that instantiate across the 
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worlds in the table are not themselves, but rather duplicates of each other. Given 
they are duplicates of each other, it seems we have no particular reason to think 
why worlds with Y electron(s) should correspond to more than one world, given 
those worlds might be exactly the same. More generally, the principle of 
recombination does not guarantee that the world corresponding to one subset (e.g. 
W1) is not identical with worlds corresponding to other subsets47. 
Nolan is correct: the principle of recombination does not guarantee that 
the world corresponding to one subset is not identical with worlds corresponding 
to other subsets. Nonetheless, I think we have a reason other than the principle of 
recombination to think that of these worlds are not all identical, and each subset 
does correspond to one subset- they are not duplicates because they may all be 
differentiated in terms of the spatiotemporal relations between electrons in each 
respective world. 
Firstly, we would need a spatiotemporal relation between electrons that 
holds across all worlds, and we need reason to believe this relation can 
differentiate every world corresponding to one subset. The obvious candidate is 
distance, as discussed in the previous chapter. Each subset will correspond to one 
world, because each world will be differentiated by the distance between electrons 
in each world. We have more than enough electron-filled worlds with differing 
distances between electrons- the number of such worlds add up to at least the 
                                                          
47 Daniel Nolan, “Recombination Unbound.”, 243. 
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cardinality of the continuum, insofar as distance may be expressed by any real 
number. 
You might find it troubling that my solution has potentially more worlds 
than the subsets posited by Forrest and Armstrong’s argument. Imagine the 
scenario where the actual world contains a finite number of electrons. Then we 
would have a finite number of subsets since there is limit to how much these 
electrons can be recombined with respect to F-ness. But in this case, we would 
have more worlds than subsets posited. For every distance between electrons with 
or without F-ness, there corresponds a world, and the number of such worlds 
would be the cardinality of the real numbers as noted above. But in this scenario 
we have only a finite number of subsets corresponding to a finite number of 
worlds. 
We need to explain why we have so many more worlds than might be 
required. I think this is not really a problem for two reasons. First, there is no 
requirement that the subsets corresponding to worlds present an exhaustive count 
of all the worlds there are. Second, the subsets in the table do not represent all 
worlds there are. Think about this: there is only subset corresponding to a world 
with no electrons with F-ness. But surely there is more than one world with no 
electrons with F-ness, insofar as the electrons in these worlds come into various 
other relations (like distance) with each other. So we should not be worried we 
have more worlds than required by Forrest and Armstrong’s argument 
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So if I am correct and (5) is true contrary to Nolan’s argument, (6) follows 
from it. Then it follows that (7) is true, insofar as no world in A will ever have the 
same number of electrons Giganto has. Giganto will always have more. Then it is 
the case that (8) is true; Giganto is not in A since no world in A has the same 
properties as it. This contradicts (2). Thus, by reductio, there is no aggregate of all 
worlds, contrary to what was posited at (8). 
So paradox ensues: if we accept there is no aggregate of all worlds, as the 
argument asks of us, we would be hard pressed to explain why we cannot make 
reference to the aggregate of all worlds, though we intuitively can. After all, read 
the preceding sentence: I was making reference to it! If we want to insist there is 
an aggregate of all worlds, we need to show why Forrest and Armstrong’s 
paradox does not occur because of some mistaken premise. That is not a trivial 
task. So either accepting that there is or there is no aggregate of all worlds is 
fraught with difficulties. 
 
2.2.1 The Proper Class of All Worlds 
 
 Above, I have tried to defend Forrest and Armstrong’s paradox-generating 
argument against Nolan’s critique. I agreed with the part of Nolan’s critique of (5) 
which states the principle of recombination does not guarantee that the duplicate 
world corresponding to one subset is not identical with duplicate worlds 
corresponding to other subsets. However, I gave us reason to think that the 
duplicate world corresponding to one subset is not identical with duplicate worlds 
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corresponding to other subsets; the worlds may all be differentiated by a 
difference in distance between the electrons in them.  In doing so, I would have 
rendered the unrestricted principle of recombination unfeasible. 
Nonetheless, we may resist Forrest and Armstrong’s argument in another 
way. Nolan can deny (8). He may say that just because we have a reductio on 
there being an aggregate of all worlds, it might not really mean much at all, 
because we can accept they might not be any aggregate of all worlds. But the 
success of the above argument does not imply there is no set of all worlds, or no 
proper class of all worlds. These two alternate ways of conceiving of all worlds 
do not fall immediately to Forrest and Armstrong’s argument, insofar as it is not 
related to aggregates, but sets or proper classes instead. 
 Ostensibly, the set of all worlds will also fall into paradox- replace all 
instances of “aggregate” above with “set”, and the paradox still ensues. So 
conceptualising all worlds as a set seems like a dead end move. However, 
conceptualising all worlds as a proper class might seem more promising. 
 Proper classes are just like sets except they are not themselves members of 
classes or sets48. This might seem to be a viable strategy for blocking Forrest and 
Armstrong’s paradox. Certainly, some ways of generating a paradox using the 
unrestricted principle of recombination are stymied. 
This sort of attempt to generate a paradox no longer works: 
                                                          
48 We will follow Nolan in modelling all classes that are not proper classes as sets. 
So an improper class is just a set. 
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We presume there is a set of all possible objects and there is a cardinality 
C for this set. There is a cardinality C* that is greater than it, and for some object 
the unrestricted principle of recombination will generate a world that contains C* 
objects. So there are at least C* objects in all worlds- the cardinality of the set of 
all possible objects is more than C. By reductio, there is no set of all possible 
objects49. 
If we replace all instances of “set of all possible objects” above with 
“proper class of all possible objects”, we will no longer generate the paradox. 
That is because it is not clear proper classes have cardinality, since cardinality is 
only well-defined for sets50 (Nolan 1996, 247).  The first premise of the argument 
would be problematic, so we cannot say the argument is sound because it is not 
clear there is a cardinality for the proper class of all possible objects. Because the 
first premise is problematic, the second is problematic too. If proper classes do 
not have cardinality, the unrestricted principle of recombination cannot generate a 
world that contains C* objects. So given this problem, it is not clear there are at 
least C* objects in all worlds. 
However, if my rehabilitation of Forrest and Armstrong’s argument above 
works, then it is not clear cashing out all worlds as a proper class is a workable 
strategy to render the unrestricted principle of recombination usable. 
Let us say we deny (1), and accept a modified version of (1) instead: 
                                                          
49 Daniel Nolan, “Recombination Unbound.”, 246. 
50 Ibid., 247. 
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(1a) There is a proper class of all worlds. 
We also modify the other premises according, replacing all occurrences of 
“aggregate of all worlds” with “proper class of worlds”. Even if we do this, we 
still have the paradox. Prima facie, this replacement of terms does not break down 
any of the steps from (1) to (10). Giganto can still end up having more electrons 
than any world in the proper class of all worlds, such that it is not equivalent to 
any world in the proper class of all worlds. That would result in the reductio that 
denies the existence of the proper class of all worlds. 
Some might contend we cannot go from having n electrons in Giganto to 
having 2𝑁 worlds via recombination, because all electrons also constitute a proper 
class51. That is because prima facie, the proper class of all electrons is not invoked 
in the steps at all. We only use the concepts of the set of electrons in any world X 
(premises (3) and (4)), and the minimum number of electrons Giganto must 
contain given the number of electrons in X (premise (6)). 
One might think that if all electrons constitute a proper class, then we 
cannot have 2𝑁 worlds via recombination for a different reason. The 2N worlds 
are meant to correspond to the number of subsets of the electrons in Giganto. 
Given that all electrons constitute a proper class, and all electrons are in Giganto, 
there can be no powerset of the proper class of electrons in Giganto such that 
there are no 2N worlds to correspond to the subsets of the electrons in Giganto. I 
think that is correct, but there are problems. First, we would require an 
                                                          
51 Nolan does think all electrons constitute a proper class (see Nolan 1996, 249). 
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explanation for this intuitive failure of plenitude, which the principle of 
recombination is meant to express. We would need reasons to convince us that 
some of the subsets of the electrons in Giganto do not correspond to a world- 
reasons other than the mathematics used in this scenario, which is a means to 
model the way the world is, but does not provide justification for why the model 
is the way it is. Second, while this might render step (4) false, it seems we can still 
advance to step (5) and so forth via another way. The number of possible 
distances between electrons for any two worlds with some specific different 
distances would already be the cardinality of the continuum. So we would always 
be guaranteed there are at least 2N worlds containing electrons, and hence have at 
least 2N electrons in Giganto. Thus, we are still mired in paradox. 
We can stem the paradox by saying the set of electrons in any world X 
should be conceptualised as the proper class of electrons in any world X. This 
move would prevent the unrestricted principle of recombination from 
recombining the n number of electrons in world X, because it will no longer be 
clear that the cardinality of the number of electrons in world is n, given 
cardinality is not well-defined for proper classes (it is effectively a denial of a 
modified (10)). But it would also render the proper class of all electrons (or even 
set or aggregate) incoherent, insofar as the proper classes of electrons in world X 
cannot be members of another proper class or set bigger than themselves (i.e. the 
proper class of all electrons). That is something we would like to have, insofar as 
we do make do quantify over all electrons. Additionally, we would also need to 
explain why the unrestricted principle of recombination does not work in 
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recombining electrons in any particular world X in this case, insofar as they seem 
intuitively recombinable. 
One might contend that even though the proper class of electrons in world 
X cannot be a member of the proper class of all electrons, but it can be a subclass 
of it. I think one way to resist this formulation is to appeal to the problem of 
cardinality with regard to proper classes. If you have the intuition that electrons 
can be counted, ad infinitum or otherwise, then you have reason to hold back on 
thinking the collection of electrons in any world X is a proper class- at least until 
that mathematical knot is settled.   
We may conclude this from the discussion above: the conceptualising of 
the collection of all worlds or electrons in the argument for the Forrest and 
Armstrong paradox as sets, aggregates, or proper classes will not result in the 
paradox being done away with. So the unrestricted principle of recombination is 
still problematic and unusable as Lewis noted, contrary to what Nolan hoped. 
The above discussion also brings to relief a more general problem with 
this strategy of reconceptualising problematic sets/ aggregates prone to paradox as 
proper classes. Prima facie, it seems like an ad hoc move: to say that there is a 
proper class of Z is just to say the members of the proper class Z cannot be 
recombined by the principle of recombination into a set or proper class bigger 
than itself. That is just to push the modelling of the limits of recombination away 
from the unrestricted principle of recombination onto objects that may be 
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recombined. The problem with this strategy was not lost on Lewis as well; he 
noted: 
“… we have no notion on what could stop any class of individuals- in 
particular the class of all worlds- from comprising a set. (4) Likewise we 
have no notion of what could stop any aggregate of individuals from 
comprising a set”52. 
If this strategy of reconceptualising problematic sets/ aggregates prone to 
paradox as proper classes is to gain any traction and not be prima facie ad hoc, it 
would have to be say more about why certain classes of objects cannot be 
recombined, rather than appealing to mathematical concepts that have no clear 




 At this point, we have established that Lewis’s thesis is correct: the 
unrestricted principle of recombination is untenable. However, he is wrong about 
the reason that it is untenable: it is not because of the trespass into the domain of 
science and the limits of metaphysics, but because of the paradox Forrest and 
Armstrong noted. The unrestricted form of the principle does not avoid falling 
into paradox, contrary to what Nolan argued. Even if we help ourselves to 
Nolan’s strategy of conceptualising the set or aggregate of all worlds as proper 
classes, it is not clear we avoid the paradox, and I hope to have shown it is a 
dubious strategy insofar as it seems ad hoc. In the next chapter, we will examine 
                                                          
52 David Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds., 104. 
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the qualified principle of recombination that Lewis prefers, and in that case, I 
hope to show that Lewis is mistaken- the qualified principle of recombination is 




Chapter 3: The Incoherence of the Qualified Principle of Recombination 
 
3.0.0 Disambiguating the Qualified Principle of Recombination 
 
 Given the incoherence of the unrestricted principle of recombination 
established by Forrest and Armstrong’s paradox-generating argument, only a 
qualified principle of recombination can do the theoretical work of specifying the 
range of worlds. In this chapter, I argue that contrary to Lewis’s hopes, the 
qualified principle of recombination is also incoherent. The general strategy of the 
chapter follows: I will show that none of the two reasonable interpretations of the 
proviso’s implication allow us to avoid Forrest and Armstrong’s paradox. Then I 
will show that even if you remain unconvinced by me and think there is a version 
of the proviso that implies a limitation that succeeds in avoiding paradox, we have 
an epistemic problem in determining the scope of the limitation. 
 
3.1.0 Disambiguating the Qualified Principle of Recombination 
 
 In this section, I cash out the two ways in which the qualified principle of 
recombination may work to limit the size and shape of space-time. It will do so by 
providing us with two plausible interpretations of the proviso “space and size 
permitting”. 
 As noted in the previous chapter, the proviso “space and size permitting” 
added in the qualified principle of recombination is not metaphysically innocuous. 
For Lewis, the qualified principle of recombination implies a mathematical or 
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scientific finding that establishes a limitation on the largest possible size of space-
time. Lewis speculates that the limitation should be cashed out in terms of a 
limitation on the dimensions of space-time53. For our purposes, it does not really 
matter what the nature of the limitation is. For our current purposes, we do not 
need to know or speculate on whether the finding that would provide us with the 
required proviso to restrict the dimensionality of space-time is mathematical or 
scientific in nature- we do not know if such a finding that would give substance to 
the proviso even exists! What matters is what the finding can do- we need to 
know the particular limitation that is implied by it. Lewis needs the limitation to 
render Forrest and Armstrong’s argument invalid, such that paradox is avoided. 
Let us disambiguate what it means for the proviso to mean a limitation on 
the largest possible size of space-time. The proviso might mean one of two things: 
(1) there is a limitation on the cardinality of the largest possible number of 
spatiotemporal relations for any world X, or (2) there is a limitation on cardinality 
of the largest possible number of spatiotemporal relations across all worlds in the 
pluriverse. I will establish their non-equivalence below. 
(2) implies (1). If there is a limitation on the cardinality of the largest 
possible number of spatiotemporal relations across all worlds in the pluriverse, 
then there is a limitation on the cardinality of the largest possible number of 
spatiotemporal relations for any world X given the qualified principle of 
recombination. Because we have the scenario where the cardinality of the largest 
                                                          
53 Ibid., 103. 
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possible number of spatiotemporal relations in the pluriverse would be the 
cardinality of the largest possible size of the sum of all worlds in the pluriverse, 
and insofar as the latter is limited, the former is too. Conceptually, the former 
cannot be larger than the latter. 
The converse is not true; (1) does not imply (2). If there is a limitation on 
the cardinality of the largest possible number of spatiotemporal relations for any 
world X, it does not follow that there is a limitation on the cardinality of the 
largest possible number of spatiotemporal relations across all worlds in the 
pluriverse. To see this, imagine a scenario in which the former is true, and we 
permit duplicate worlds54. In this case, the cardinality of the largest possible 
number of spatiotemporal relations in the pluriverse would always have a higher 
cardinality than the one already posited, because we can always generate more 
duplicate worlds to jack up the cardinality of the largest possible number of 
                                                          
54 Note that while Lewis thinks duplicate worlds do not do any explanatory work, 
and hence favours denying their existence, the sentence “If there is a limitation on 
the cardinality of the largest possible number of spatiotemporal relations for any a 
world X, then there is a limitation on the cardinality of the largest possible 
number of spatiotemporal relations in the pluriverse” does not imply such a 
commitment, so neither shall we. 
 
If the denial of duplicate a worlds results in the sentence being true, then that just 
makes my job easier: the cardinality of the largest possible number of 
spatiotemporal relations for any a world X is equivalent to a limitation on the 
cardinality of the largest possible number of spatiotemporal relations in the 
pluriverse, and in the following sections of the thesis, you would just have to 
consider the case of whether a limitation on cardinality of the largest possible 
number of spatiotemporal relations times in the pluriverse really does not result 
Forrest and Armstrong paradoxes. That is because a limitation on cardinality of 
the largest possible number of spatiotemporal relations in the pluriverse implies a 




spatiotemporal relations across the pluriverse. So we have a counter model where 
there is a limitation on the cardinality of the largest number of spatiotemporal 
relations for any world x, but no limitation on the largest possible number of 
spatiotemporal relations across all worlds in the pluriverse. I contend that neither 
conception of the limitation on the largest possible size of space-time can block 
Forrest and Armstrong’s paradox-generating argument. In the following sections I 
demonstrate this. 
 
3.1.1 The Qualified Principle of Recombination Implying a Limitation on the 
Largest Possible Size of Space-Time for any World X 
 
 Let us assume for the sake of argument that the qualified principle of 
recombination’s proviso “size and shape permitting” means there is a limitation 
on the cardinality of the largest possible number of spatiotemporal relations for 
any world X. Ostensibly, this limitation has to falsify one of the claims from (1) 
to (9) presented in chapter two above, resulting in the failure of the unrestricted 
principle of recombination to imply paradox. I think it is not clear any of the steps 
of the argument are falsified by accepting this particular conception of qualified 
principle of recombination in place of the unrestricted one. Let me go through the 
contentious candidates, and show that none is falsified. 
 You might imagine (2) is false. It might be false because we can justify it 
by noting that if there were a Giganto, then the unrestricted principle of 
recombination would generate a paradox as noted above. So it must be the case 
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that there is a limit on the largest possible size of space-time for any world X. But 
we must recognise the nature of such a save for Lewis. This is just an ad-hoc save 
to patch up a problem that stems from an intuitive version of the principle of 
recombination (i.e. the unqualified one), and if we have no independent way to 
motivate this limitation, denying (2) on the basis of the generation of the paradox 
is just unconvincing. 
 You might imagine that (3) would be falsified for the following reason. (3) 
asserts that for any world X which is part of A, X has N electrons, where N may 
be any natural number up to the cardinality of the natural numbers. That is to say, 
(3) is asserting it is possible that the number of electrons in a world is finite and it 
is possible it is infinite. Assuming we have a limitation on the largest possible 
number of spatiotemporal relations for any world X, we might say (3) is false. It 
is not possible that the number of electrons in a world is infinite, given the 
limitation on the number of relations. That is because it does not seem coherent to 
imagine a metaphysical scenario where we have an infinite number of electrons 
with a limited number of relations between one another. 
I have two arguments against the reasoning above. Firstly, a limitation on 
the cardinality of the largest possible number of spatiotemporal relations for any 
world X does not entail the fact that the objects in X are finite in number. Think 
of the metaphysical scenario above more carefully: let us say there is N number of 
electrons (where N is the cardinality of the natural numbers). At the very least, 
these electrons would be related to each other by a relation of distance. Given 
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distance is cashed out as a real number, the number of relations in such a world 
would be (2N)N. This is still a limited number of relations, albeit an infinite limit. 
So it is not the case that a limitation on the number of spatiotemporal relations 
implies a finite number of objects in the world, such that (3) is false because it is 
not possible for the number of electrons to be infinite. This relates to my second 
point: we have no a priori reason to think to have a limitation on the cardinality of 
the largest possible number of spatiotemporal relations for any world X implies 
that the limitation is finite. The limitation could be the cardinality of some infinity 
for all we know- and we certainly can imagine a world with an infinite number of 
electrons, so I contend we should accept (3) as it is cast above. So we cannot say 
that (3) is false, unless we can deal with the objections above. 
You might imagine that a stronger move would not be to say that (3) is 
false because the number of electrons in a world X is finite, but to say that the 
number of electrons in a world X is some definite cardinality beyond which there 
can be no more electrons. But to make this move, we would need that cardinality 
to be something below the cardinality of the natural numbers. 
If we want the number of electrons to be more than the cardinality of the 
natural numbers, we would need to justify setting the restriction that way- and this 
restriction would have to account for why the number of electrons are 
uncountable. 
If we want the number of electrons to be less than the cardinality of the 
natural numbers, that would just render the number of electrons in any world X 
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finite. That does not seem reasonable to me, insofar as it seems intuitive to think it 
is possible that electrons can be counted ad infinitum. The burden would be on the 
interlocutor to explain away our intuition that it is possible there is an infinitude 
of electrons, such that we should have a hard finite limit on the number of 
electrons in any world. Also, one might contend that while it might be intuitive to 
think that the actual number of electrons is countable, that does not imply that the 
possible number of electrons must be countable as well. That is correct, but 
because electrons in other worlds are just duplicates of the electrons of this world, 
it seems intuitive to say they are countable in those other worlds too since they are 
countable in this world. Insofar as the electrons in any particular world is 
countable, the electrons in the sum of all worlds should intuitively be countable 
too, regardless of whether we might/ might not finish counting the electrons of a 
single world. 
You might imagine that (5) would be falsified for the following reason. I 
noted that (5) is true because all subsets of the N electrons which have F-ness 
correspond to a different world each, because each subset corresponds to worlds 
where the distance between electrons differ. But you might imagine that given a 
limitation on the largest number of spatiotemporal relations for any world X, not 
all of the subsets of the number of electrons in world X with property F-ness 
would correspond to a world. That is because some subsets would contravene the 
limitation on the cardinality of the largest possible number of spatiotemporal 
relations in any world X. These subsets would not correspond to any world. Thus, 
(5) is false, because not all subsets of n electrons with the property F-ness 
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correspond to one world each (where n is a number that can be any number up to 
the cardinality of the natural numbers). 
Let us say n is some finite number. It does not seem unfair to say that each 
subset in this case corresponds to one world each, insofar as worlds with the same 
number of electrons that possess F-ness might be differentiated by the distance 
between electrons, and we have no reason to think F-ness might have any relation 
to the limitation on the cardinality of the largest possible number of 
spatiotemporal relations in any world X. So in this case, it seems we have no 
reason to think not all subsets of n electrons with the property F-ness correspond 
to one world each. 
Let us say n is some infinite number. In this case, it will be the cardinality 
of the natural numbers insofar as we want to retain the intuition of electrons being 
countable. Even if we accept that some subsets contravene the limitation on the 
largest possible number of spatiotemporal relations in any world X and remove 
these subsets from calculation of the number of worlds with electrons, the number 
of worlds with electrons is still 2n. Think of it this way: if we remove all the 
subsets that contravene the limitation on the cardinality of the  largest possible 
number of spatiotemporal relations in any world X, the remaining subsets still 
number as the cardinality of the continuum insofar as the remaining worlds with 
differing distance between electrons still number as the cardinality of the 
continuum- which is 2n. That is because the number of possible distances between 
electrons for any two worlds with some specific different distances would already 
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be the cardinality of the continuum- no matter other facts about its dimensionality 
or such. So we would always be guaranteed there are 2n worlds. So in this case, 
(5) is still true. 
If this is the case, and the two most obvious candidate premises for being 
falsified by the acceptance of the current qualified principle of recombination are 
not falsified. We still end up with Forrest and Armstrong’s paradox even with the 
current iteration of the qualified principle of recombination. 
 
3.1.2 The Qualified Principle of Recombination Implying there is a 
Limitation on the Cardinality of the Largest Possible Number of 
Spatiotemporal Relations in the Pluriverse 
 
Let us assume for the sake of argument that the qualified principle of 
recombination’s proviso “size and shape permitting” means there is a limitation 
on the cardinality of the largest possible number of spatiotemporal relations in the 
pluriverse. As above, this limitation has to falsify one of the steps from (1) to (9), 
resulting in the failure of the unrestricted principle of recombination to imply 
paradox. I contend it is not clear any of the steps from (1) to (9) are falsified by 
accepting this particular conception of qualified principle of recombination in 
place of the unrestricted one. 
There is a way to model the acceptance of this version of the qualified 
principle of recombination. To say that the cardinality of the largest possible 
number of spatiotemporal relations in the pluriverse is limited is equivalent to 
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saying that the cardinality of the set of all worlds is limited. Worlds are just 
collections of worlds made up of spatiotemporally-related spatiotemporal regions. 
If cardinality of the largest possible number of spatiotemporal relations in the 
pluriverse cannot be bigger than it already is, then the cardinality of the set of all 
worlds is limited such that the number of spatiotemporal relations in the 
pluriverse is limited too. 
If we accept this, then this version of the qualified principle of 
recombination would make a familiar move: it would reject (1) in favour of (1b). 
(1b) There is a set of all worlds that has a limited cardinality. 
If this is the implication of the qualified principle of recombination, it 
would not avoid paradox. The situation is analogous to that of the modification of 
(1) to (1a) in the previous chapter. We modify the other premises accordingly, 
replacing all occurrences of “aggregate of all worlds” with “set of all worlds that 
has a limited cardinality”. Even if we do this, the paradox is still generated. The 
reason is that Giganto can still end up having more electrons than any world in the 
pluriverse, such that it is not equivalent to any world in the set of all worlds that 
has a limited cardinality. That would result in the reductio that denies the 
existence of the set of all worlds that has a limited cardinality. 
So conceptualising the qualified principle of recombination as implying a 
limitation on the cardinality of the largest possible number of spatiotemporal 
relations in the pluriverse does not work to do away with Forrest and Armstrong’s 
argument that results in paradox. 
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So far, we have seen that either interpretation of the proviso of the 
qualified principle of recombination does not render Forrest and Armstrong’s 
paradox unparadoxical. This is contrary to Lewis’s belief that the qualified 
principle of recombination is the version of the principle that can be the 
theoretical work he wants it to do. The qualified principle of recombination 
cannot do such theoretical work, because it has the problems of paradox the 
unrestricted version of the principle has too. 
 
3.2.0 The Epistemic Difficulty 
 
 If one remains unconvinced by what I have argued above, and thinks that 
it is possible to cash out the proviso “size and space permitting” of the qualified 
principle of recombination such that it does not imply a paradox, the onus is on 
that interlocutor to cash out the proviso. But let me go one step further. I contend 
that even if we do have a reasonable conception of the proviso about the limits of 
space-time that renders Forrest and Armstrong’s argument unsound, it would run 
into an epistemic problem. We would have the problem of knowing the worlds the 
limitation on the size and shape of space-time quantify over. 
Given Lewis’s position, the proviso on the size and shape of space-time 
comes in the form of a restriction on the dimensions of space-time. We shall call 
it the size thesis henceforth: 
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The size thesis is the fact that substantiates the qualified principle of 
recombination’s proviso with regard to the restriction on the dimensions of 
space-time. 
The size thesis is either a contingent fact or a necessary fact. It seems it 
cannot be a contingent fact insofar as the only world to which we have causal 
access is this actual world, and even if we somehow discern the size and shape of 
space-time in this world, it is not clear the size of space-time in this world is the 
largest possible size. For that, we would require causal relations with other 
worlds, and Lewis’s modal realism does not permit trans-world spatiotemporal 
relations55. Therefore, it seems the thesis must be in the class of necessary facts. 
 
3.2.1 Domain Restrictions upon the Size Thesis 
 
Next, we would need to know the sense of “necessary” Lewis has in mind 
when he uses it to prefix a thesis regarding the largest possible size and shape of 
space-time. Lewis conceives of modal operators like necessity and possibility as 
quantifiers over worlds via accessibility relations. Lewis does not offer an 
analysis of how many kinds of necessity there are, but it is prima facie clear 
different kinds of necessity might be characterised by different accessibility 
relations. Lewis only gives the example of nomological necessity, but we can 
extrapolate to at least one other kind of necessity, such as logical necessity56. On 
                                                          
55 David Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds, 70. 
56 Ibid., 20 
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such a view, we just do not quantify over worlds that are not within the domain 
restrictions of the given modal operator57. The worlds we do not quantify over 
may exist, and may or may not be quantified over by a different modal operator. 
The kind of necessity used to cash out the size thesis is crucial. If the 
domain of quantification is too limited, we will not be able to prove that there are 
no worlds that have a larger space-time. We would only be able to prove that the 
worlds which we quantify over have a largest space-time of size X and shape Y, 
but we would not have proven that there are no worlds larger than that, because 
there might be other existent worlds outside of the domain of quantification that 
are larger. This is why Lewis needs the size thesis to be a logically necessary 
claim- or whatever the broadest kind of necessity claim that quantifies over all 
worlds is. 
But how can a thesis about the size of space-time be a logically necessary 
claim? Insofar as it is an issue debated in science, it would seem to be a 
nomologically necessary claim, not a logically necessary one. If Lewis wants to 
push for the size thesis to hold over all worlds, we have an epistemic issue in 
determining which claims of science are nomologically necessary, and which are 
not. The burden of proof is on Lewis to show the size thesis is not just a 
nomologically necessary claim, but a logically necessary one. 
                                                          
57 Note that just because a world is impossible in one sense does not imply it does 
not exist at all. 
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I think this is probably why Lewis retreats to a “hope” for the existence of 
some breakthrough in mathematics- and not science- that implies a limitation of 
the size and shape space-time58. That is probably because he subscribes to the 
view that mathematics is logically necessary. However, I think it is not clear even 
a mathematical breakthrough is enough to get Lewis the logically necessary truth 
of the size thesis. 
That is because need to distinguish between mathematics used in 
modelling scientific phenomena, and mathematics not involved in modelling 
scientific phenomena. If the breakthrough comes from mathematics used in 
modelling scientific phenomena, we would still be left with an epistemic problem 
regarding whether the model is nomologically or logically necessary. 
Mathematics is used to model a scientific hypothesis about this-worldly 
phenomena. It would seem a stretch to say that any scientific hypothesis about 
this world is a logically necessary truth that has bearing on all worlds. Lewis 
needs to say more if he wants a breakthrough in the mathematics used to model 
this-worldly phenomena to have such vast trans-world implications. 
If the breakthrough comes in the area of mathematics not involved in 
modelling scientific phenomena, then we need to ask what kind of impact this 
kind of mathematics has on our world or trans-world empirical issues in general. 
For all we know, it could be recreational mathematics that has no bearing on 
                                                          
58 David Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds., 103. 
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empirical affairs59. The burden of proof would be on Lewis to say something 
about how it does have any bearing on empirical affairs. 
 Space-time is an empirical phenomenon that is a concern of science, so 
trivially, the mathematics used to model it would be used in modelling scientific 
phenomena. If I am correct, this means Lewis’s hope for a breakthrough through 
mathematics is not really a hope at all. He would still be fraught with the 
epistemological problem mentioned above. 
 
3.3.0 The Incoherence of the Principle of Recombination as Epistemic 
Principle 
 
 In this chapter, we established the incoherence of the qualified principle of 
recombination- it is principle which Lewis falls back on as a potentially workable 
epistemic principle for modal realism. It is not clear that the qualified principle of 
recombination does not have problems with Forrest and Armstrong paradoxes. 
Even if it does not, the proviso which says there is a limitation on the size and 
shape of space-time has a problem justifying the worlds it quantifies over; it is not 
clear having a breakthrough in either science or mathematics implying a 
limitation in the size and shape of space-time is sufficient to establish the extent 
the limitation holds across all worlds. 
                                                          
59 Mark Colyvan, The Indispensability of Mathematics (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2001), 107. 
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So joining the conclusions of these two chapters, neither the principle of 
recombination in its unrestricted nor its qualified form can serve as a foundation 
for modal realism. This is a problem for the theories of modality that employ 
them- such as modal realism- as it would reduce the explanatory power of such 
theories. Insofar as the principle of recombination (in either form) has such 
problems, we would either have to accept the principle and live with its epistemic 
problems or paradoxes that beg for explanation, or we have to drop the principle 
of recombination as an account of the range of worlds there are or expression of 
plenitude, and be left with an explanatory gap with regard to how we make sense 
of expressions of plenitude or how we know the range of worlds that are. 
As such, theories of modality that do not employ a principle such as the 
theory of recombination would stand to gain in the final cost-benefit analysis 
against modal realism, and we have reason not to employ the principle of 
recombination as a means to explain plenitude or as an account of the range of 






 Given the considerations above, I hope I have provided reason to think the 
principle of recombination is fraught with theoretical problems that render it 
unfeasible. Despite how intuitive it may be, it cannot serve as a way to render 
expressions of plenitude meaningful, nor serve as a way to express the fact with 
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